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DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP V. PATRIARCHY:
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON RAWLS
Marion Smiley*
I. INTRODUCTION

While feminist scholars have devoted a great deal of energy during
the past twenty years to showing what various canonical works in the
history of political theory have had to say about women, they have not
generally confined themselves to textual analysis as an end in itself.
Nor have they generally restricted their critical attention to the sexist
manner in which particular theories have characterized women or to
questions about whether such sexism was intended by the particular
theorists in question. Instead, they have, as a group, proceeded to ask
two more fundamental sets of questions about the patriarchal content,
as well as consequences, of these theories in an effort to assess how
valuable-or damaging-they are to the lives of some, if not all,

women.'
The first set of questions takes as its subject matter the place of
sexism in a particular theory and asks: How sexist or patriarchal is the
theory?2 Does the theory characterize women in demeaning ways and

place them in subordinate positions to men? Does it do so as part of
* J.P. Morgan Chase Professor of Ethics, Department of Philosophy/Program in
Women's Studies, Brandeis University.
1. Unfortunately, not all feminist theorists have been as attentive as they should
be to the lives of all women. Indeed, as Bell Hooks, Elizabeth Spelman and others
have pointed out over the years, many feminist theorists have generalized about
women's lives on the basis of a description of those women who are most privileged in
society. See, e.g., Bell Hooks, Ain't I a Woman? (1981); Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory:
From Margin to Center (2000); Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Women (1988).
Feminists in the field of law have taken heed of these critiques in recent years, and in
some cases have provided very helpful ways of avoiding the problem at hand. See, e.g.,
Black British Feminism: A Reader (Heidi Safia Mirza ed., 1997); Critical Race
Feminism: A Reader (Adrian Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Feminist Legal Theory: An
Anti-Essentialist Reader (Nancy E. Dowds & Michelle S. Jacob eds., 2003); Martha
Minow, Making All the Difference (1990).
2. While the terms "sexist" and "patriarchal" are frequently used
interchangeably, I use the first here to denote unequal or differential treatment based
on sex and the second to denote the various attributes-ideological, material,
psychological, social, and political-of a general system of power that is based on the
subordination of women to men, a system of power that can, and does, exist alongside
and as part of other systems of power, whether they are economic, legal, racial,
cultural, or religious, and is, as such, potentially pervasive without being the primary
cause of all other kinds of oppression.
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its general project, or simply because it has been thoughtless? Is the
theory's methodology reflective of men's experiences only? Do all of
the theory's major tenets require the subordination of women to men,
or are there parts of the theory that are not patriarchal? Is there
anything egalitarian about the theory? If so, what place does such
egalitarianism have in the theory as a whole, and how, if at all, can it
be sustained?
The second set of questions takes as its subject matter the actual
treatment of women and asks: What consequences would a particular
theory have for women if it were put into practice? Would the theory
enhance or diminish the lives of women in any way? Help or harm
them?3 If so, how? Would the theory's consequences be the same for
all women, or would the theory affect different women in different
ways? What is it about the theory that leads to such consequences?
Are there particular parts of the theory that would, if translated into
practice, prove to be especially harmful to women? Especially helpful
to them?
I ask both kinds of questions below of John Rawls's theory of
justice.
I do not, by any stretch of the imagination, do so
comprehensively. Instead, I place only a handful of feminist concerns
at the center of my attention and focus on one aspect of Rawls's
theory only, namely, the Original Position as Rawls develops it in both
A Theory of Justice4 and Political Liberalism.5 I ask: Does Rawls's
formulation of the Original Position in either of these works require a
patriarchal family? Does it promote the subjugation of women to
men by virtue of either its methodology or its content? Does it hold
out any promise for combating those gender and race-based
hierarchies of power that subordinate women in practice? If so, what
is that promise and can it be realized within Rawls's theory?
I argue that while Rawls's Original Position is not without its
shortcomings, it-or at least the version of it that Rawls develops in
Political Liberalism-does have the potential to challenge patriarchy
in both public and private life if it is interjected with a more robust
and democratic notion of citizenship than Rawls now provides, and if
Rawls's political liberalism is understood as distinctly democratic
liberalism. I sketch what I take to be the required notion of
3. Feminist theorists do not, of course, always agree on what constitutes harm in
this context. Indeed, almost all of the major disagreements among feminists in recent
years-including those having to with whether universal identities harm women, how
damaging capitalism is to women, what constitutes sexual harassment, whether
feminists should use the state to challenge patriarchy, and what place, if any,
meritocracy has in the lives of women-come down in part to what constitutes both
harm to women in general and harm that is by nature gender-based.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). Because the feminist critics of Rawls
whom I shall be evaluating refer to the text of the original edition of this work, I, too,
refer to the 1971 edition in my analysis of their critiques.
5. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (rev. ed. 1996).
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democratic citizenship-which is closely related to that put forward by
contemporary feminist and critical race theorists-and interject it
back into Rawls's Original Position. I then suggest very briefly why
doing so is both compatible and incompatible with (different) parts of
Rawls's general theory of justice.
I make clear throughout my argument that the interjection of this
democratic notion of citizenship back into the Original Position is
necessary for the sake not only of rendering Rawls's Original Position
useful to feminists, but of defending his general theory of justice
against what I take to be three of the most important claims made by
feminists against Rawls's Original Position. These are, first, that that
the methodology underlying Rawls's Original Position-individuation
and abstraction-privileges men over women by undermining the
values of care and relationship;6 second, that individuals behind the
Veil of Ignorance cannot produce principles of justice that are
powerful enough to challenge the patriarchal family;7 and third, that
Rawls's insistence on a Veil of Ignorance takes away from black
women and other women of color in particular the racial and cultural
identities necessary to both their moral agency and their personal
integrity.8
I begin with a general critical assessment of each of these feminist
claims in an effort to show both what is powerful about them and why
they may not be as devastating to Rawls's general theory as those who
make them frequently suggest that they are. I then show why, in light
of what is right about these claims, Rawls had to go further than he
did in placing the value of social and political equality-construed in
terms of both freedom from hierarchical domination and the ability of
individuals to share political power with other citizens-at the center
of our attention. Finally, I suggest how Rawls might do as much by
taking seriously his own characterization (in his later works) of
individuals in the Original Position as democratic citizens.
II. MASCULINIST STARTING POINTS
The most frequently aired feminist complaint about Rawls is that
his methodology-individuation and abstraction-both undermines
the value of relational thinking and the ethics of care (those ways of
knowing and behaving ethically that are frequently, although not uncontroversially, associated with women), and renders incompetent
those who accept these ways of knowing and behaving ethically.9
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. The number of feminists who have lodged this complaint over the years is
considerable.
For a representative sample of these complaints, see Christine
Di Stefano, Configurations of Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective on Modern
Political Theory (1991); Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature
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Here the focus is invariably on the Veil of Ignorance. How, feminists
from Nel Noddings ° to Allison Jaggar" and Iris Young 2 ask, can

Rawls's theory of justice possibly represent the experiences of women
if individuals in the Original Position are expected to leave their
caring selves, their relationships to others, and their context-bound
ways of knowing behind?
Two related worries surface here. The first regards the content of
the particular principles of justice developed behind the Veil of
Ignorance and goes something like this: Individuals in the Original
Position are obliged to think of themselves as discrete individuals

rather than as mothers, caretakers, and participants in relationships of
various kinds.

Hence they will, by the very logic of the Rawls's

contractarianism, not choose principles of justice that have anything
to do with care and the value of relationships.

Instead, they will

choose principles of justice that build on what are sometimes viewed
as the masculinist values of individual autonomy, means-ends
rationality, and universality. 3
The second worry addresses the negative consequences that will
follow from these principles of justice once they are institutionalized,
consequences that will in some cases extend to the entire community
(1983); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988); Revisioning the Political
(Christine Di Stefano & Nancy J. Hirschmann eds., 1996); Iris Marion Young, Justice
and the Politics of Difference (1990); Virginia Held, Mothering Versus Contract, in
Beyond Self-Interest 287 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990); Linda Hirshman, Is the
OriginalPosition Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1860 (1994); Jennifer
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,1 Yale J.L. &
Feminism 7 (1989).
Linda C. McClain does a very nice job of critically analyzing and
reconstructing several of the key arguments made in this literature in "Atomistic
Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1171, 1171-218 (1992).
Interestingly, many feminist theorists have in recent years pulled back from
making these claims in the extreme version found in, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky's
work on autonomy as care, not because of their growing support for Rawls's theory,
but because of their growing sense of frustration with both the overly simplistic
"woman's voice" put forward by Carol Gilligan, and the overly romantic and depoliticized ethic of care developed by Nel Noddings and others, an ethic that might, if
it is not placed in political context, disempower women by both burdening them with
gender-based practices of care and depriving them of rights to autonomy. For a
sophisticated corrective, see Jean Grimshaw, Philosophy and Feminist Thinking
(1986).
10. Nel Noddings develops her central claims in Women and Evil (1989), and
Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (2003).
11. See Jaggar, supra note 9.
12. See Young, supra note 9.
13. The sense that these values are masculinist is found in many of the works cited
supra in note 9. Carol Gilligan is perhaps best known for articulating them as such.
See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (rev. ed. 1993). For two more analytic
discussions of these values as masculinist, see Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason,
Metaphil., Jan. 1979, at 18, and Janna Thompson, Women and the High Priests of
Reason, Radical Phil., Summer 1983, at 10.
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but that will in most cases fall primarily on the shoulders of women
and others who place care and relationships at the centers of their
These consequences include the deeming of care and
lives.
relationships as both outside the realm of justice and quintessentially
non-political; the continued inattention to abuses that occur in areas
where care and relationships are primary, e.g., in the family, as well as
in other areas of life where a distributional model of justice is not
appropriate; and the labeling of those who refuse to take on the
trappings of self-interested rational actors as morally immature and
incapable of full participation in the political and legal community. 4
Are these two concerns warranted? If so, how serious are they as
challenges to Rawls's general theory? Rawls's methodology clearly
downplays the value of particular kinds of moral thinking, namely,
those that insist on the importance of historical embeddedness at the
epistemological, rather than the communal, level (e.g., Hegelian ways
of thinking rather than contemporary communitarianism). Moreover,
Rawls's theory does so, like all other theories, by fiat, rather than with
a foundational argument. Hence, to the extent that it expects all
individuals-and not just those who choose to be Rawlsians-to
participate in the Original Position (which is open to interpretation),1 5
it excludes some individuals from participating in the development of
those principles of justice that will presumably be imposed on them all
as community members.
But things are not so clear-cut when it comes to gender. For, as
feminist critics of Gilligan in particular have been quick to point out in
the last few years, not all women are caregivers or contextual
thinkers.16 Nor do women and men-especially after the age of thirty14. The question of whether the ethic of care has any place in legal institutions has
proved to be particularly tricky. For a sense of the pitfalls associated with trying to
incorporate an ethic of care into legal institutions, see Robin West, Caring For Justice
(1997).
15. Whether or not all members of the community are expected as rational actors
to participate in the Original Position depends on two things. The first is whether
Rawls means to retain his characterization of the Original Position as deriving from
conditions set down by the idea of freedom, or whether he is serious about presenting
the Original Position as an idealization of liberal democracy. The second is whether
Rawls's theory of justice is now the theory of justice-rather than a theory of justiceonce placed back in the liberal democratic community out of which it has supposedly
been crystallized. Rawls may be immune from accusations of exclusion here if he
retains his purely Kantian starting points, since the exercise of the Original Position
would then itself remain philosophical. But Rawls does not want-at least in Political
Liberalism-to retain Kant's metaphysical trappings. Nor can he do so, as he
acknowledges, and still derive principles of justice that have legitimacy. See Rawls,
Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 99-101. The problem is that once he puts
forward his theory of justice as political, not metaphysical, he is faced with the
requirement that all individuals in a liberal democratic community will have to accept
the Original Position as a frame of reference-which may not be possible without
excluding those individuals who have principled reasons, either philosophical,
religious, or political, for not doing so.
16. For a set of diverse arguments on this question, see Linda K. Kerber et al., On
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five-differ as much as Gilligan and her followers originally suggested
they do in either moral or social life. Indeed, while women continue
to be more closely associated than men do, both ideologically and in
practice, with care, with the tending of relationships, and with
contextual ways of knowing, these associations-and the gender
differences that follow from them-are growing steadily less
pronounced in North American society, and in any case have always
been culturally and
economically more grounded than Gilligan
17
originally surmised.
In the end, we might be better off asking, as Joan Tronto does,18 not
whether liberal individualism writes women out of the picture by
virtue of its methodology (as if there were only one methodology that
liberals employ), but whether liberal individualism writes out of the
picture those who value care, who concentrate on mending
relationships, and/or who think contextually as a result of (in this case
Rawlsian) methodological starting points. Does Rawls's methodology
write these individuals out of the picture? Does it do so in any
necessary fashion?
Two possible claims could be made in this context. The first is that
women-or anyone else who could not in good faith or for cultural
reasons separate themselves from others as part of a Rawlsian thought
experiment without violating their sense of moral personality-would
by necessity be excluded from the group that we consider to be
capable of rational (and probably moral) choice. The second is that,
in standing back from their relationships, individuals in the Original
Position could or would develop principles of justice that, once
institutionalized, could or would devalue practices of care and modes
of contextual thinking, along with those individuals who embrace
these things as valuable either in their own lives or in the lives of
others.
Both claims are very serious. But neither can be made, as Jaggar
and others have tried to do in their critiques of Rawls's methodology,
on an a priori basis by pointing to Rawls's description of the Original
Position. 9 For, contrary to many of Rawls's feminist critics, the
In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary Forum, 11 Signs 304 (1986). For an
excellent sense of the implications of this empirical evidence for the ethics of care, see
Marilyn Friedman, Beyond Caring: The De-Moralizationof Gender, 13 Can. J. Phil.
199 (1987), and Michele M. Moody-Adams, Gender and the Complexity of Moral
Voices, in Feminist Ethics 195 (Claudia Card ed., 1991).
17. For a range of these arguments, see William J. Friedman et al., Sex Differences
in Moral Judgments? A Test of Gilligan's Theory, 11 Psychol. Women Q. 37 (1987);
Cressida J. Heyes, Anti-Essentialism in Practice: Carol Gilligan and Feminist
Philosophy, Hypatia, Summer 1997, at 142; Alice Pitt, The Expression of Experience:
Code's Critique of Gilligan'sAbortion Study, 20 J. Moral Educ. 177 (1991).
18. See Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of
Care (1993).
19. Alison Jaggar writes that, from Rawls's perspective, human individuals could
exist outside a social context; their essential characteristics, their needs and interests,
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Original Position does not describe either moral agents in all aspects
of their lives or the kind of polity that would necessarily exist once
principles of justice were institutionalized. Instead, it describes a
model for generating principles of justice. Rawls goes out of his way
to make this clear when he defends the Original Position:
As a device of representation its abstractness invites
misunderstanding. In particular, the description of the parties may
seem to presuppose a particular metaphysical conception of the
person; for example, that the essential nature of persons is
independent of and prior to their contingent attributes, including
their final ends and attachments, and indeed their conception of the
good and character as a whole.
... I believe this to be an illusion caused by not seeing the original
It is important to
position as a device of representation ....
distinguish three points of view: that of the parties in the original
position, that of citizens in a well-ordered society, and finally, that of
ourselves-of you and me who are elaborating iustice as fairness and
examining it as a political conception of justice. 0
Since the Original Position does not tell us about the whole moral
and political life of individuals, it cannot-on an a priori basis-be
thought to exclude those who fit Gilligan's model of care from either
moral or political life. Indeed, it leaves us with three distinct
possibilities that Rawls's feminist critics need to take into
consideration. The first is that individuals who fit Gilligan's model of
care might be fully capable of standing back from their own lives and
of thinking hypothetically about justice without giving up who they
are as caring individuals who value relationships highly. The second is
that they might, as moral and political thinkers, actually want to stand
back from their own lives and think about justice in this way. The
third is that they, as well as other individuals in the Original Position,
might choose principles of justice behind the Veil of Ignorance that
are open to a community that is self-consciously interdependent.
Can Rawls's feminist critics sustain their two critical points against
Rawls's methodology in light of these three possibilities? As things
now stand, many women feel perfectly comfortable standing back
from their own situations and thinking abstractly about general moral
principles-even if they are extremely caring and contextual thinkers
in social situations, i.e., even if they fit Gilligan's female model during
most of their lives. Moreover, they do so in ways that are not at all
inconsistent. For to think about the nature of morality and to think

their capacities and desires, are given independently of their social context and are
not created or even fundamentally altered by that context. Jaggar, supra note 9, at 29.
20. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 27-28.
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and act ethically in social, political, and legal situations is not the same
thing. Indeed, they are significantly different enterprises.21
The second claim, namely, that the Original Position would give
way to principles of justice that would either ignore or violate
practices of care, as well as those individuals associated with them, is
not one that we could evaluate in any definitive way without empirical
inquiry into concrete applications, since presumably we would have to
know something about how these principles are institutionalizedembodied within particular kinds of social, political, and legal
institutions-in order to conclude whether particular kinds of thinking
or behaving would be acceptable or not. In other words, it is the
organization of our social, political, and legal polity, not our
distributive principles, that makes a difference to the acceptability of
Gilligan's "women's voices., 22 Hence, it is to these organizational
structures that feminists would presumably have to turn. I assume
here that in doing so they would have to take the goal of nonpatriarchy as key.
All of this is to suggest that Rawls's theory of justice is not selfevidently masculinist in its starting points and may turn out to be
masculinist or not in particular cases depending on the particular
institutional contexts in place. What, though, if anything, is there of
positive value in Rawls's Original Position with respect to the feminist
model of care and/or contextual thinking? Can it be used in any way
either to legitimate Gilligan's model or to aid in its
institutionalization?
In Justice, Gender, and the Family and elsewhere, Susan Okin
suggests that Rawls's Original Position might be used to get
individuals to think, not about their self-interest as rational actors, but
about how others understand the world. 23 At one point, Okin goes as
far as to contend that Rawls's Original Position not only works well as
a model of empathy, but works better as a model of empathy than it
does as a model of rational choice, because
[a]s Rawls himself says, the combination of conditions he imposes
on them "forces each person in the original position to take the good
of others into account." The parties can be presented as the
"rational, mutually disinterested" agents characteristic of rational
choice theory only because they do not know which self they will
turn out to be. The veil of ignorance is such a demanding stipulation
that it converts what would, without it, be self-interest into equal
concern for others, including others who are very different from
21. Among other things, while thinking about the nature of morality requires
abstraction from morality in particular contexts, acting and behaving ethically-and
figuring out how to do so-in social, political and legal situations requires contextual
thinking with the use of moral principles that may themselves have been derived in a
very abstract fashion.
22. Gilligan, supra note 13, at 1-4.
23. See Susan Moller Okin,Justice, Gender, and the Family 98-101 (1989).
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ourselves. Those in the original position cannot think from the
position of nobody, as is suggested by those critics who then
conclude that Rawls's theory depends on a "disembodied" concept
of the self. They must, rather, tjink from the perspective of
everybody, in the sense of each in turn. To do this requires, at the
very least, both strong empathy and a preparedness to listen
carefully to the very different points of view of others.24
Okin is right here, I think, that Rawls's Original Position could be
used as a model for empathy-or at least as a model for
understanding the world from others' perspectives. Moreover, she
herself succeeds in providing us with a very good sense of how this
model might work to sustain other-regarding relationships. But she
cannot place the model back into Rawls's own theory without doing
two things that are very controversial, if not impossible. The first is to
explain away Rawls's own rational choice vocabulary as a
misrepresentation of his intentions.
The second is to provide
individuals within the Original Position with a motivation for using
the Veil of Ignorance to be empathetic-or, in other words, to provide
a reason for taking turns in a way that would enhance mutual
understanding.
Okin tries to explain away Rawls's use of rational choice vocabulary
by implying that Rawls uses the language of rational choice theory for
the sake of convenience only, rather than for any well thought out
reasons. But Rawls does use this language extensively throughout
virtually all of A Theory of Justice and develops various rational
choice models on the basis of it.26 Moreover, he never retracts his
rational choice models or tells us that he has changed his mind about
their value. Hence, we cannot assume that he does not take them
seriously-even if they might not capture many of his other
statements about the necessity of leaving one's self-interest behind
and thinking about the good of others in the community.27
Okin is also on shaky ground when she says that we can find in
Rawls's work a motivation for the pursuit of empathy behind the Veil
of Ignorance. 28 Admittedly, Rawls does say that the combination of
conditions that he imposes on individuals in the Original Position
24. Id. at 100-01.
25. See id. at 100.
26. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4.
27. In his later years, Rawls did soften his claims for rational choice, though.
While he was adamant in A Theory of Justice that his theory of justice is "a part,
perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice," id. at 16, he says in
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical that while rational choice is very
important, "[t]here is no thought of trying to derive the content of justice within a
framework that uses an idea of the rational as the sole normative idea." See John
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: PoliticalNot Metaphysical, in Collected Papers 401 n.20
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
28. See Okin,supra note 23, at 101.
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"forces each person in the original position to take the good of others
into account. '29 But the good of others is not the same thing as their
perspective. Nor does it follow from Rawls's statement that the
combination of conditions in question "forces" individuals to take the
good of others into account that they can take such a good into
account within the Original Position. Rawls's conditions might simply
be unrealizable as so stated. As things now stand, it is fairly clear that
individuals cannot know enough about each other in the Original
Position to formulate a notion of others' good that is particular
enough to make empathy possible.
In any case, one cannot conclude from the impossibility of
"think[ing] from the position of nobody"3 that Rawls does not at
points imply the necessity of thinking from such a position or that a
view from everybody is itself necessary, valuable, and possible. Rawls
clearly implies the necessity of thinking from the position of nobody in
his claim for abstraction from particularity, and while a view from
everybody might indeed be necessary, valuable, and possible, it needs
to be defended as such on its own merits. Hence, while Okin's own
use of Rawls's Original Position-taken out of the context of Rawls's
general theory-is very useful and important as a way of enhancing
both the ethics of care and the practice of maintaining relationships, it
is not, I suspect, as compatible with Rawls's own theory as she
contends.
III. FATHERLY CONTRACTORS/PATRIARCHAL FAMILIES

The second feminist critique of Rawls cited above, namely, that
Rawls cannot challenge the patriarchal family and may even legitimize
it as the norm, is more worrisome. For Rawls nowhere-even in his
later works-distances himself from patriarchy as a system of power.
His concessions to Susan Okin in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited
are not very extensive and they come surprisingly late in his career.3 '
Indeed, if anything, Rawls seems even more intent in his later works
to treat gender, not as part of a social and political system of power,
but as yet another particular identity that individuals need to leave
behind when they think rationally about justice.
In any case, Rawls makes perfectly clear in A Theory of Justice both
that individuals in the Original Position are heads of household and
that they contract for family members.
According to Rawls,
individuals in the Original Position are not to be thought of as "single
individuals" but as "heads of families."3 2 Likewise, as heads of

29. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, at 148.
30. Okin,supra note 23, at 101 (emphasis omitted).
31. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in Collected Papers 573,
595-601 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
32. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, at 128.
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families, they are to be thought of as "representatives of families."33
Rawls does not exclude women in this context. But he does tell
individuals in the Original Position to "imagin[e] themselves to be
fathers" and "to ascertain how much they should set aside for their
sons by noting what they would believe themselves entitled to claim of
their fathers."3 4
Rawls's characterization of individuals in the Original Position as
male heads of household is problematic for at least two reasons. First
of all, since the Original Position is, according to Rawls, both prepolitical and necessarily prior to principles of justice, Rawls's
characterization of individuals in the Original Position as male heads
of household leads Rawls, not only to present patriarchy as both
natural and legitimate, but to render illegitimate any effort to
scrutinize the justice-or even the morality-of family life. Indeed, as
Jane English goes as far as to argue, "[b]y making the parties in the
original position heads of families rather than individuals, Rawls
makes the family opaque to claims of justice. 35
Second, if individuals behind the Veil of Ignorance are male heads
of household, they might well, in their efforts to generate rational
principles of justice, generate principles of justice that are patriarchal
to the core, since individuals in the Original Position are supposed to
think about a polity that is rational for individuals like themselves,
and they themselves are patriarchal. Admittedly, in cases where the
male heads of household in question are understood primarily as
caretakers, rather than as embodiments of total power in the domestic
realm, they will probably generate principles of justice that are
benevolent rather than disciplinarian. But these principles will still be
patriarchal and hence a threat to the empowerment of women.
While Rawls explicitly refers to individuals in the Original Position
as male heads of household,36 he might not, of course, have had to do
so within the confines of his theory. Indeed, he might have been able
to get around the two problems cited above by replacing the term
"male heads of household" with either that of "heads of household"
or that of "individuals" in his characterization of the Original Position.
Hence, we need to ask: Does Rawls need to characterize individuals
in the Original Position as heads of household? Does he need to
characterize heads of household as male? Is there anything about his
theory that compels him to do so? Might he not simply talk about
heads of household as both male and female or forget the domestic
sphere altogether and go back to talking about "individuals"?
Rawls, as it turns out, had to be able to talk about heads of
household in order to satisfy the conditions of intergenerational
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 289.
Jane English, Justice Between Generations,31 Phil. Studies 91, 95 (1977).
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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justice. While he said that to talk about heads of household is not
necessary to the Original Position itself, he made clear that to talk
about them as heads of household is necessary to ensure that "the
whole strand is tied together" between generations37 or, in other
words, to ensure that each person in the Original Position cares about
the well being of some persons in the next generation. Hence, Rawls
could not simply move back to talking about individuals qua
individuals in the Original Position. Instead, he had to talk about
individuals there as heads of household. How, if at all, might Rawls
have talked about these heads of household as being in some cases
women?
Rawlsians needs to be able to do two things in order to talk about
women as heads of households. The first is simply to make sure that
the term "head of household" is not understood in terms that are
biased towards men or associated with patriarchal institutions. The
second is to characterize heads of household in the Original Position
(if there are two of them) as co-heads of household-since otherwise
women could not be heads of household in two-parent families
without simply substituting matriarchy for patriarchy.
Rawls should be able to meet the first condition fairly easily. For
even though patriarchy might have to be retained as part of the social
and political knowledge deemed relevant to rational choice-making in
the Original Position (which is not an insignificant matter), it does not
need to be in the Original Position itself as long as it is not considered
natural. In other words, there is no good reason why heads of
household have to be male at the very beginning of the story,
especially if individuals are construed as rational actors rather than as
members of particular groups-even though conservatives might
endeavor to show that a patriarchal society is in the end the most
efficient.
Indeed, contrary to the view of many feminists, one of the most
progressive features of Rawls's theory is its insistence that we abstract
from both particular identities and particular social and political
institutions in the Original Position in order to avoid social biases. In
the case of gender, the fact that individuals do not know their sex
behind the Veil of Ignorance" might well prove to be a source of
gender equality-and perhaps even a challenge to homophobia. So,
too, might the fact that individuals in the Original Position are
expected to leave their particular relationships, cultures, and
institutions behind, since the latter are bound to be patriarchal in part,
if not in whole.
Could Rawlsians, though, in an effort to include women (and men
in same-sex couples) in the Original Position, talk about co-heads of
37. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, at 129.
38. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 24-25.
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household? Rawls would, I suspect, have had a difficult time doing so,
because to talk about co-heads of household would create the need to
define the relationship as between the two parties-and relationships
are in general not supposed to be part of the Original Position. Not
surprisingly, the challenge would become even more difficult if Rawls
were obliged to specify the non-patriarchal nature of these
relationships, because to do so would presuppose a theory of family
justice prior to justice in the public sphere. What are Rawlsians to
do?
Susan Okin provides an answer by suggesting that Rawls's own
theory of justice, if read in a particular way, both requires a
genderless, non-patriarchal society and helps us to sketch the
normative basis of an egalitarian family. Okin begins with Rawls's
own theory of agreement in the Original Position and argues from
there. According to Okin, agreement by representative persons in a
truly non-sexist or human conception of justice is only possible for
persons who share a similar basic psychology and moral development,
which in turn means that the Original Position must incorporate
various anti-patriarchal measures, including the overturning of all
gender-structured institutions, into itself, as these institutions reflect
differences in psychology and moral development that will undermine
agreement on justice.39
For if principles of justice are to be adopted unanimously by
representative human beings ignorant of their particular
characteristics and positions in society, they must be persons whose
psychological and moral development is in all essentials identical.
This means that the social factors in influencing the differences
presently found between the sexes-from female parenting to all the
manifestations of female subordination and dependence-would
40
have to be replaced by genderless institutions and customs.
Moreover, Rawls's theory does not just require a genderless society.
41
Instead, according to Okin, it helps us to view such a society as just.
Here, like Rawls, Okin invokes the Veil of Ignorance. But she uses it
to make the following three feminist claims. First, parties behind the
Veil of Ignorance who were ignorant of their sex would not divide up
family duties in a way that encourages their economic dependence on
one sex. 42 Second, in order to have equality in the public sphere,
which she says Rawls's theory of justice promotes, we will have to
have complete equality among adults in the family with respect to,
among other things, domestic work and childrearing.4 3
Third,
individuals in the Original Position, who do not know where they
39. See Okin, supra note 23, at 99, 105-07.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 107.
See id. at 102-03.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 104.
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stand, would not allow social conditions that undermine self-respect
and would thus emphasize gender-free socialization and "equal
expectations of self-definition and development."'
While questions of moral psychology and development are largely
empirical questions, Okin is probably correct in asserting that men
and women will, within a Rawlsian framework, have to share a basic
psychology and moral development in order for a common point of
view and agreement to be possible 4 5 -unless, of course, it turns out
that there are two different paths to the same moral point of view,
which is empirically unlikely but logically possible. Hence, Okin is
probably right that Rawls's Original Position requires the
transcendence of gender and the assumption of a genderless society.
(Is this true only in the Original Position, one has to wonder, or is it
true also in a society based on Rawlsian principles?)
But to say that Rawls's theory requires the transcendence of gender
is not to say that Rawls's general theory would accept the
institutionalization of a genderless society. I suspect that Rawls's
moral egalitarianism, if not Rawls himself as a theorist, would be quite
open to many of Okin's suggestions about the need for a genderless
society, as these suggestions can, I think, be defended with the use of
straightforward egalitarian principles. But, with Josh Cohen and
others,46 I have to wonder whether those of Okin's suggestions that
require state action in what Rawls would stubbornly call the private
sphere-for example, Okin's policy that mandates payment of half a
spouse's salary to his or her mate-are compatible with Rawls's
liberal hands-off policy in personal life.
Moreover, while J.S. Russell and others may go too far in
contending that "the feminist principles of justice that [Okin]
advances are in no sense a product of the 'original position,' '.. as
distinct from Okin's own feminism, they are right to argue that these
principles have to be in place before individuals in the Original
Position can begin to deliberate about principles of justice. Okin can
defend herself here. But she can do so only by assuming that there
are two Original Positions, one that takes place necessarily before the
other. In other words, she can proceed only by assuming that
individuals make two contracts: one to develop principles of justice in
the family; the other to develop justice in the public sphere. What is
wrong with that?
Two potential difficulties arise here for Rawlsians, if not for Okin
herself. First of all, if there is a contract prior to that which generates
44. Id. at 105.
45. Id. at 107.
46. See Joshua Cohen, Okin on Justice, Gender, and Family, 22 Can. J. Phil. 263
(1992).
47. J.S. Russell, Okin's Rawlsian Feminism? Justice in the Family and Another
Liberalism,Soc. Theory & Prac., Fall 1995, at 397, 404.
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principles of justice in the public sphere, the fundamental principles of
justice are no longer those associated with justice in the public sphere
as Rawls understands that sphere. Instead, they are those associated
with the prior contract, e.g., that which here establishes a just family.
Okin may herself welcome such a prospect. But she cannot do so
without leaving a great deal of Rawls's fundamental theory of justice
behind and imposing on Rawls a two-part Original Position that goes
against the logic of his foundational social contract.
Second, if Rawlsians wanted to retain both Okin's principles of
gender justice and her characterization of these principles as grounded
in the Original Position without falling back on such a two-contract
system, they would have to go back to viewing these principles of
family justice as a mere theoretical necessity of the Original Position
that Rawls develops in A Theory of Justice rather than as principles
that are important to pursue in their own right. The loss of Okin's
own contract theory of family justice would, I think, be a shame here,
since it both uses the Original Position in a much more interesting way
than this latter approach and is a very strong tool for challenging
patriarchy. Hence, I would have thought it worthwhile either to cut
her theory loose from Rawls's altogether or to think about how else
Rawls's Original Position might be used to support her genderless
society as both legitimate and just.
I suggest in the final part of this paper that we might be able to use
Rawls's Original Position to challenge patriarchy in both the public
and private spheres if we could show that individuals in the Original
Position were, as democratic citizens, necessarily free of the sort of
patriarchal baggage that Okin herself rightfully rejects.48 But let me
first turn to the remaining-and perhaps most damaging-feminist
critique of Rawls. I refer here to the critique of Rawls as incapable of
developing a theory of justice that is both fair to and appropriate for
members of oppressed or subordinate racial communities-including
women of color.
IV. THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE: A RECIPE FOR RACIAL
INEQUALITY?

In The Political Significance of Social Identity: A Critique of
Rawls's Theory of Agency,49 Kevin Graham makes the following
argument about why Rawls is not able to deal adequately with the
oppression that minority members of American society experience.
Rawls's theory of justice, writes Graham, conceives of individuals in
the Original Position both atomistically and egoistically." It focuses
48. See infra Part V.
49. Kevin M. Graham, The PoliticalSignificance of Social Identity: A Critique of

Rawls's Theory of Agency, Soc. Theory & Prac., Summer 2000, at 201.
50. See id. at 202, 209.
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narrowly on the personal goods of individual rights and liberties, fair
shares of social resources, and self-respect, rather than on socially
conditioned and constructed goods, including those racial and cultural
identities which are, according to Graham, extremely important both
to the organization of the community in general and to the ability of
minority members to exercise their autonomy as persons.5 1 Indeed,
Graham claims, Rawls's
theory of justice treats these identities as
"politically irrelevant. 5 2
Interestingly, Graham does not, like Jaggar and others cited in Part
II of this paper, assume that what happens in the Original Position is
what would happen in a polity ruled by Rawlsian principles of justice.
Indeed, he concedes that Rawls is correct to present the Original
Position as a mere device of representation, rather than as a
freestanding argument for Rawlsian principles of justice. 3 Moreover,
he does not deny the value of Rawls's rational experimental method
or treat it as racially, culturally, or gender biased in and of itself.54 In
other words, he does not deem the method biased by virtue of its
abstractness per se. Instead, he zeroes in on Rawls's list of primary
goods in the Original Position and argues that Rawls's failure to
acknowledge cultural and racial identities in the Original Position is
particularly bad for racial and cultural minorities, including women of
color.5 5
Graham's argument proceeds on the basis of three textually
justifiable claims about the character of the Original Position with
respect to Rawls's primary goods. The first is that Rawls assumes in
his account of primary goods that the citizens of a well-ordered liberal
democratic society would generally require the same means for moral
development and human fulfillment.5" Rawls, Graham acknowledges,
makes clear that the well-ordered liberal democratic society that he
has in mind is pluralistic with respect to citizens' differing conceptions
of the good and the various comprehensive doctrines that that they
use to interpret these conceptions.5 7 But Rawls, Graham points out,
also conceives of this society as homogeneous with respect to the
kinds of means that these citizens would require to pursue their
conceptions of the good and to secure their higher order interests.58
Second, Rawls's account of the primary goods "arbitrarily"perhaps "without justification" would be better here-limits the scope
of the means to moral development and human fulfillment by treating

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 209-10.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
See id. at 222.
See id. at 209-11.
Id. at 213.
See id.
Id. at 213-14.
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them exclusively as objects of individuals' possession.5 9 As Graham
points out, only "[s]ome of these goods, including income and wealth,
are paradigmatic examples of material possessions that individuals can
own and control. But all of them, including the relevant rights,
liberties, powers, and prerogatives, can be distributed among
individuals who can possess and exercise them at their pleasure."6
Hence, according to Graham, we can conclude both that Rawls's
account of the primary goods assumes that social justice amounts to
the equitable distribution of "things across society,"6 and "that "[i]f
the primary goods could not be conceived of as things, at least in some
abstract sense, we could not make sense of the idea that we can check
to see how equitably they are distributed across society."'62
Third, even though Rawls claims that his views about individuals in
the Original Position are neutral with respect to the metaphysical
nature of persons, he does assume an "individualistic social
ontology"6 3 by virtue of both his account of the primary goods as
containing "only goods that individuals can possess, exercise, or enjoy,
including individual rights and liberties, income, and wealth,"' and his
insistence that individuals' identification in the Original Position with
various groups be understood as either "voluntarily formed or
politically irrelevant."65
Not surprisingly, this latter insistence
becomes particularly important to anyone concerned about the
importance of cultural and racial identity to moral agency and
personal integrity. For it treats as irrelevant that which may be
necessary to both moral agency and personal integrity in the case of
racial and cultural minorities.
Rawls does not, of course, dismiss the importance of these
identifications in general. Instead, he removes them from any
definition of the "public, or institutional, identity" with which he is
concerned. 66 According to Rawls, while a person's "noninstitutional
or moral identity"6 7 depends on voluntary associations, affections, and
loyalties to others with whom an individual chooses to ally herselfon the particularities of her life-her public identity depends only on
her having the two moral powers that he cites-a capacity for a sense
of justice and for a conception of the good-as well as a determinate
conception of that good.68
Rawls makes clear that only an individual's public identity is
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 210.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 208-09.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 30.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 19, 30-32.
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present in the Original Position, since what a person requires in order
to secure her higher order interests depends solely on her status as a
"free and equal person" as Rawls understands that term.69 Likewise,
he makes clear that an individual's memberships in social groups
defined by ethnicity, race, and gender, are not-and cannot be-part
of her public identity, because they do not have anything to do with
her status as moral agent. 70 Nor, according to Rawls, are these things
even part of her moral identity, since they are not freely chosen and
cannot be freely withdrawn.71
Graham argues in this context, contrary to Rawls, "that individuals'
memberships in different social groups do affect their chances to
develop their moral powers and to fulfill their conceptions of the
good, ' 72 and hence must be taken into consideration at the level of
public identity.73 He does so on the basis of two very persuasive
arguments. The first is that social groups are, contrary to the claims of
Rawls and other liberals, non-chosen: "[A] social group is unlike an
association insofar as one does not choose to become a member of
such a group, but rather discovers oneself already to be a member."74
The second is that moral agency presupposes a sense of personal
identity, and that a sense of personal identity for many minority
members of American society requires race and culture consciousness.
According to Graham,
[a] person's culture is the context in which he makes moral,
religious, social, and lifestyle choices, and in which he has reasons
for choosing some forms of life over others. Without the existence
of culture as a context for choice, there would be no rational
grounds for choice. Thus when a minority culture disappears,
whether through assimilation, genocide, or whatever, many former
members of that culture may no longer be able to make sense of
their lives.75
Because individuals' memberships in different groups affect their
chances to develop their moral powers and to fulfill their conception
of the good, Graham concludes that two things would have to be true
of Rawls's Original Position in order for it to satisfy both the needs of
minorities and the principle of fairness across racial groups. First,
individuals in the Original Position would have to be able to know
who they are as members of a racial community and to identify with

69. Id. at 18-19.
70. See id. at 24-25.
71. Rawls makes clear in Political Liberalism that the only kinds of human
collective groups that his theory admits are voluntary associations, societies, and
morally arbitrary collections. Id. at 40-43.
72. Graham, supra note 49, at 209-10.
73, See id.
74. Id. at 210.
75. Id. at 214.
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others in this community. 76 Second, group identity (or the ability to

identify with one's group in cases where group identity is necessary to
the development of moral powers) would have to be considered a
primary good.77

Could Rawls possibly accept either of these two

amendments?
Rawls acknowledges something like the first of these amendments
in his response to his communitarian critics, and makes clear that he is

not at all interested in accepting it. Indeed, he characterizes the
acknowledgment of particular identities-whether group based or

purely individual-in the formulation of principles of justice as both
contrary to any theory of justice that aspires to moral legitimacy and

unnecessary. He argues that such an acknowledgment is contrary to
any theory of justice that aspires to moral legitimacy because it goes
beyond the concept of a public person.7" It is unnecessary, he argues,
because all citizens can be said to require the same primary goods,
although they might, he concedes, need more or less of these goods.7 9

76. See id. at 209-13.
77. See id.
78. Rawls continues to insist throughout his later works that while individuals can
of course enjoy their particular identities as private persons, they cannot assert these
identities in discussions of justice without violating the moral tenets of justice itself.
As late as 1997, Rawls writes that, while we may value the identities that individuals
have as "members of families and other associations," in thinking about justice
we don't view persons as socially situated or otherwise rooted, that is, as
belonging to this or that social class, or in this or that property and income
group, or as having this or that comprehensive doctrine. Nor are we
appealing to each person's or each group's interests though at some point we
must take these interests into account. Rather, we think of persons as
reasonable and rational, as free and equal citizens, with the two moral
powers.
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 31, at 607.
Graham's opposition to this notion of homogeneity is pronounced. He writes:
[Wihile some social groups may merely need more of the same primary
goods that everyone else has, others may need different kinds of primary
goods. Consider the members of a threatened minority culture ....
Because a person's culture is the context in which she develops and exercises
her ability to have a conception of the good and a sense of justice, the
continued existence of a person's culture is a necessary condition of that
person's development and exercise of these moral powers.
Graham, supra note 49, at 213.
"Members of the dominant culture," on the other hand, "do not need the
same special protections for their own culture." Id. at 214.
79. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 182-86. Rawls concedes here
that persons whose physical capacities are reduced below a basic minimum level of
functioning may need a greater index of primary goods than those with normal
physical capacities. But he does not concede a need among disempowered groups in
society for such a greater index-and certainly not for different primary needs. See id.
Graham's major contention with Rawls is that he simply does not understand-or
care about-the needs of minority groups that have been oppressed in society.
According to Graham, "[ilf all the members of a threatened minority culture are to
satisfy what Rawls calls their higher-order interests, they must have the chance to live
out their lives as members of this culture, which significantly shapes their social
identities." Graham, supra note 49, at 214.
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Moreover, Rawls goes so far in Political Liberalism as to say that
even if the refusal to acknowledge group identities creates social and
political conditions that lead to the death of particular cultures, this
consequence, while "regrettable," is "not unjust."8
According to
Rawls, "[n]o society can include within itself all forms of life. We may
indeed lament the limited space, as it were, for social worlds, and of
ours in particular."8 But the necessity of letting some cultures die out
is "not to be taken for arbitrary bias or injustice."82 Instead, it means
that "[t]he nature of its culture.., proves too uncongenial."83
The second amendment would appear equally unacceptable to
Rawls, as it moves us beyond Rawls's individualistic ontology and
requires us to assume a group-based, if not a relational, view of
individuals in the Original Position. Rawls needs his individualistic
ontology in order to sustain his contract theory. All social contract
theorists do. And while Rawls can, as I suggested in Part I, accept a
relational view of individuals in society after principles of justice have
been institutionalized, he cannot do so in the Original Position
without sacrificing his whole rational choice methodology, because, as
he makes clear, that methodology is based on the representation of
discrete individuals.
In any case, Rawls would, I think, lose a lot if he chose to accept
either amendment, since his "standing back" theory of justice, unlike
theories of justice that are embedded, can supply us with two things
that would seem to be especially important to the very kinds of
movements against racism that Graham and other anti-racist activists
want to see promoted. The first is a way of talking about justice
across groups that is legitimate for all members of the community by
virtue of its not being tied to the values of any one group. The second
is a principle for ruling out of bounds modes of racial identification
that violate others' rights, for example, those associated with the Ku
Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups, while promoting
modes of racial identification that are necessary to personal integrity.
None of this is to suggest that we need to give up on the value of
group identification in general. Nor is it to suggest that group
identification is not crucial to racial minorities. It is. Instead, it is to
suggest only that if individuals are asked to identify with their groups
while formulating principles of fairness, as distinct from being asked
to identify with their group when, say, developing their moral powers,
they will not be able to formulate principles of fairness that are either
legitimate in general or useful to those who want to combat racism.
Where does this leave us with respect to Rawls's ability to counter
racism? Rawls may not be able to allow individuals to have particular
80.
81.
82.
83.

Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 197-200.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id.
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group identities in the Original Position or to include group identity as
a primary good. But he does not need to rule out group identity as
something of value either. Nor does he need to remain tied to group
identity as a mode of combating racism. Indeed, I suggest below, if
Rawls were to begin with his own characterization of individuals in
the Original Position as democratic citizens, he might be able both to
retain the value of group identity without giving up on his "standing
back" approach to justice in general, and to challenge racism as a
system of power.
V. DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP V. PATRIARCHY

Let me begin here by stressing two general points of importance
that come out of the above discussion. The first is that while the
feminist claim that Rawls's theory of justice is antithetical to the
values of care and relationship is fairly weak,84 the other two feminist
claims cited above, namely, that Rawls's Original Position cannot be
used to challenge the patriarchal family," and that Rawls takes away
from minority women the racial and cultural identities necessary to
the sustenance of their moral agency and personal identity,86 are much
more worrisome. Indeed, they are potentially very damaging to
Rawls's general theory of justice.
The second is that if Rawlsians want to meet the challenges implicit
in both critiques and to become more useful in undermining both
patriarchy and systems of racism, they will have to find a way, not of
endowing individuals with a particular or group identity behind the
Veil of Ignorance or of giving up on the Veil of Ignorance altogether,
but of thinking about individuals behind the Veil of Ignorance in such
a way that these individuals would, in formulating principles of justice,
naturally pursue the non-subordination of women and minorities as a
goal. In other words, they will have to find a way of endowing
individuals in the Original Position with a general identity that when
acted upon leads them-without asserting their own particular group
identities-to challenge both patriarchy and systems of racism. How
might they do so?
Obviously, if Rawls's theory of justice were itself patriarchal, then
there would be no use in asking this question. But it is not. Rawlsian
individuals behind the Veil of Ignorance do not think of themselves as
superior or inferior to those beneath them in the social hierarchy.
(How could they do so without knowing who they are?) Nor, if we
are willing to leave Rawls's extremely unfortunate remarks about
individuals in the Original Position as male heads of household87
84.
85.
86.
87.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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behind, which I suggested above we can do,88 are Rawlsian individuals
attached to particular social roles that would make them welcome
members in any patriarchal community about which we are now
aware.
Hence, even if they were to know something about
patriarchy-which depends on what counts as relevant background
knowledge 8 9 -they could not be construed as the source of patriarchy
or as willing partners to the reproduction of patriarchy in practice.
Moreover, Rawlsian individuals in the Original Position are,
according to Rawls, moral equals. 9° Hence, they might, as moral
equals, be expected to value moral equality, i.e., treat it as a moral
principle, in the Original Position and to develop principles of justice
on the basis of such a valuation that challenge the kinds of institutions
that, by virtue of their hierarchies of domination and subordination,
lead to the moral disrespect of particular groups in practice. In other
words, Rawlsian individuals might, by virtue of who they are as moral
equals, naturally generate the kind of principles of justice that are
required in this context.
Such a possibility is intriguing. But it falls apart fairly quickly for
two closely related reasons. First of all, in Rawls's schema, moral
principles are supposed to come out of, rather than precede, the
contracting situation. Hence, individuals in the Original Position
cannot associate themselves with moral equality as a moral principle.
Nor can they, without such a principle, value moral equality or use it
to develop principles of justice. Instead, they can only be moral
equals-and then only if the Kantian association between rationality
and moral worth holds up under scrutiny.91
88. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
89. Interestingly, Rawlsians might be able to recognize patriarchy and other
hierarchical systems of domination in the Original Position if they could include
knowledge about these systems in the basic psychological, social, economic, and
political knowledge required of individuals behind the Veil of Ignorance. But they
could not do so in any critical way. Instead, they could do so only by recognizing
patriarchy as part of the necessary "background knowledge" that is supplied to
rational agents in their choice of principles of justice. Moreover, in so recognizing
patriarchy as such a relevant subject matter, they might be stuck having to accept the
"laws" of patriarchy as part of the status quo (a situation which can only get worse for
them if, as many socialist feminists have argued over the years, capitalism is itself
patriarchal). This, I take it, is why feminists and other left-leaning critics of Rawls
have been so adamant over the years about the conservative nature, not only of the
particular psychological, social, economic, and political facts that Rawls allows his
contractors to know, but of his inclusion of such background information in general.
90. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in Collected Papers
255 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). Rawls, of course, expresses their moral equality in a
number of Kantian ways. These range from his restatement in A Theory of Justice of
Kant's claim that morality itself has its source in rationality, and that all individuals
qua rational beings in the noumenal realm are thus moral equals, Rawls, supra note 4,
at 251-52, to his treatment of them in Political Liberalism, A Theory of Justice, and
elsewhere as moral equals by virtue of their various moral powers to both pursue
their own goods and formulate principles of justice rationally.
91. I argue in Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community (1992) that
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Second, while individuals in the Original Position can legitimately
be endowed with the identity "moral equal"-a label no more
particular than that of "rational actor" or "head of household"-they
cannot generate principles of justice out of the expression of that
identity (as distinct from a principle of moral equality). For the
identity "moral equal" constitutes a moral status, rather than a
normative perspective. Likewise, to be a moral equal is to express
one's moral equality to others rather than to value moral equality.
Hence, while one might, in acting out one's identity as a moral equal,
assert that one is a morally equal member of the community, one
cannot develop principles of justice based on the value of moral
equality.
Moreover, it is not clear how far moral, as distinct from social or
political, equality can take us in this context anyway. Moral equality
is, contrary to Iris Young and other postmodern critics of
Enlightenment liberalism,9" very important to any movement that
hopes to de-legitimate natural hierarchies. But it is not, as Young and
others correctly point out, sufficient to challenging patriarchy or any
other system of hierarchical domination, since it does not focus our
attention on the power relationships that exist between individuals as
group members and that lie at the root of almost all of those various
kinds of gender-based domination and subordination that have
harmed women (and others) over the years.
Indeed, as Kant himself makes clear in The Metaphysical Elements
of Justice93

and other works, individuals can, from a Kantian

perspective, be treated as moral equals within all sorts of hierarchical
relationships of domination and subordination, because to treat
individuals as moral agents (and hence morally equal) is to recognize
something about their moral wills rather than something about their
Not
social and political lives or their material well-being.94
surprisingly, the seeming disjuncture between moral equality, on the
one hand, and social and political equality, on the other, becomes
even less problematic within the Kantian system once the hierarchies
of domination and subordination in question are construed as
natural-which they are, uncannily, by Kant himself, although not by
Rawls.
All of this suggests two things in general. First of all, if individuals
in the Original Position are to be helpful in combating patriarchy, they
such an association does not in fact hold up and in the end needs various cultural
assumptions to work.
92. Young argues this position most fully in Justice and the Politics of Difference
(1990). See also Linda J. Nicholson, Feminism/Postmodernism (1990). I refute this
view at great length in Gender Justice Without Foundations, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1574
(1991).
93. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the
Metaphysics of Morals (John Ladd trans., 1965).
94. Id. §§ B-E, at 34-37.
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will have to value each other as equals in both public and private life,
rather than just value the principle of moral equality. (Susan Okin is
surely right here that without combating patriarchy in the family, as
well as in the polis, the whole project falls flat.)9 5 Second, they cannot
value each other in this way simply as a matter of principle abstracted
from who they are as persons. Instead, they have to value each other
in this way because that is who they are as, in this case, participants in
the Original Position. How, if at all, might these conditions be met
within Rawls's own work?
Two possibilities come to mind here. The first involves turning to
the conditions of public reason that Rawls develops in Political
Liberalism9 6 and The Idea of Public Reason Revisited97 in an effort to
tease out of them principled constraints on the domination of women
and minorities within the public sphere.98 The second involves
sticking with a focus on identity but moving from Rawls's
identification of individuals in A Theory of Justice as rational actors99
to his identification of them as political citizens (who are also rational
actors) in PoliticalLiberalism."°
I resist the first turn for two reasons. First of all, while Rawls's
discussion of public reason in his later works may help us to place
constraints on sexism and racism within the public sphere (which is
itself questionable), it does not help us to get at domination in
personal, family, and social life, where a great deal of oppression takes
place. Second, as Rawls himself makes explicit, the conditions of
public reason exclude the giving of particular kinds of religiously (and
hence also culturally) based reasons, including, interestingly enough,
many which are patriarchal. Hence, those women (and men) who
would, by virtue of their religious and cultural identities, find it
appropriate to give such reasons would be excluded from public
deliberation.
Rawls's re-identification of individuals as democratic citizens, on
the other hand-which is, contrary to several of Rawls's own
statements, a genuine re-identification-would seem to be much more
useful in this context. For the identity of "democratic citizen," as I
will define it shortly, unlike that of "moral equal," requires nonhierarchical social and political relationships of the sort that would
appear not only to challenge patriarchy in the public sphere, but to lay
the foundations of a non-patriarchal family.
The identity of

95. See Okin, supra note 23, at 104.
96. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5.
97. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 31, at 573.
98. I have in mind here the kind of effort that S.A. Lloyd put forward in Situating
a Feminist Criticism of John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1319
(1995).
99. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, at 142.
100. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 29-35, 72-77.
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"democratic citizen" does not get ruled out by the logic of Rawls's
Original Position in the way that, say, either a particular identity or a
principle of democracy or of moral equality would get ruled out. Let
me then turn briefly to Rawls's notion of democratic citizenship.
Rawls asserts in Political Liberalism that a person in the Original
Position is both "someone who can be a citizen" '' and someone who
can be a citizen within liberal democratic life. l"2 Likewise, he makes
clear, not only that individuals in the Original Position are, as
democratic citizens, both free and equal, but that freedom and
equality, rather than, say, membership in a community in which all
competent adults share power, are the hallmarks of democracy. Here
he says outright: "Since we start within the tradition of democratic
thought, we also think of citizens as free and equal persons.' 0 3
But Rawls does not want to paint a full picture of democratic
Nor does he want to leave
citizens qua democratic citizens.
democratic citizens enmeshed in the democratic culture out of which
he supposedly crystallizes their identities as liberal democrats. For, to
do so would, from Rawls's theoretical perspective, weigh down
individuals in the Original Position with too much culturally particular
baggage. Hence, he hones his definition of a democratic citizen and
presents us with a conception of an idealized democratic citizen."
"Thus," he writes, "while we begin with an idea of the person implicit
culture, we idealize and simplify this idea in
in the public political
10 5
various ways.,
What does democratic citizenship as freedom and equality come to
mean for Rawls? Rawls makes clear that, while he is talking about
democratic citizens, whom he refers to as political persons, he is still
talking about moral agents:
The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity
for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the
powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected
with these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to
to be fully cooperating members of
the requisite minimum degree
10 6
society makes persons equal.

101. Id. at 18.
102. Rawls writes that "[w]hen we describe the way in which citizens regard
themselves as free, we describe how citizens think of themselves in a democratic
society when questions of political justice arise." Id. at 33.
103. Id. at 18-19.
104. Rawls makes clear throughout his later work that he is speaking of idealized
democratic citizens. In The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, he claims that "ideally
citizens are to think of themselves 'as if they were legislators and ask themselves
what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they
would think it most reasonable to enact." Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
supra note 31, at 577.
105. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 20.
106. Id. at 19 (citation omitted).

1624

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Rawls's new version of individuals in the Original Position does
take him some distance in challenging, not just unequal rights, but
abusive relationships.
Rawls himself makes this explicit:
In
particular, these conditions must situate free and equal persons fairly
and must not allow some persons greater bargaining advantages than
others. Further, such things as threats of force and coercion,
deception and fraud must be excluded. °7
But the kinds of coercion that are excluded are only those that will
allow individuals in the Original Position, who are now supposed to be
democratic citizens, to exercise the two moral powers cited abovethose having to do with the ability to formulate principles of justice
and notions of the good, on the one hand, and those having to do with
the pursuit of rationality, on the other. In other words, Rawls's notion
of the democratic citizen is not extensive enough to exclude those
kinds of relationships that might prohibit citizens from participating in
social and political life as equals. Indeed, as long as Rawls is serious
about not acknowledging the importance of racial, cultural, and
gender differences among his "political persons," he, unlike Okin, has
no choice but to leave these damaging hierarchical relationships in
place.
The problem here is not, as some feminists, such as Iris Young,
argue, that Rawls has excluded the identity of women in the Original
Position and hence cannot take patriarchy into consideration.0 8 Nor
is it, as Graham and others who are concerned about racial and
cultural subordination have argued, that Rawls has excluded cultural
and racial identities in the Original Position and hence cannot talk
about racial hierarchies that disempower minorities.1"9 Instead, it is
that Rawls has not included in his definition of "political persons" the
need of these individuals both to have their particular identities taken
seriously by others, and to accept the particular identities of other
members of the community as valuable.
How, if at all, might Rawls do so? At the very least, he would have
to take seriously his own contention that individuals in the Original
Position are politicalpersons with a "public part" to their identities.'
As things now stand, Rawls refers to individuals in the Original
Position as political primarily as a way of distancing himself from the
metaphysical underpinnings of the Original Position that he relies
upon in A Theory of Justice and that he wants to move away from in
Political Liberalism. But he does not describe individuals in the
Original Position as political by, say, recognizing their membership in
a political community of which they are necessarily a part. Instead, he

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 23.
See Young, supra note 9, at 104-05.
See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 29-35.
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continues to describe them primarily as moral agents whose public
identity is a matter of their "moral powers" as rational actors.
Moreover, while Rawls does identify them as democratic citizens,
rather than just as political persons, he uses their identity as
democratic citizens, not to tell us what principles of justice those who
are genuinely democratic might hone behind the Veil of Ignorance,
but rather to legitimize the Original Position itself. According to
Rawls in Political Liberalism, the Original Position does not have its
source in rationality per se."' Instead, it has its source in the culture
of a liberal democratic community that embraces a constitutionally
structured set of laws and policies that are themselves embodiments of
liberal democratic principles.'12
Rawls does not, as we might expect, go on to tell us what those who
adhere to a liberal democratic culture, as distinct from rational actors
who embrace primary goods that include freedom, demand of their
principles of justice. Nor does he make explicit exactly what the
connections are between liberal democratic culture and the two
principles of justice that he contends have such a culture as their
"backdrop." Instead, he associates being a democratic citizen with
essentially the same two moral powers that he originally presented in
A Theory of Justice in primarily Kantian terms, and demonstrates the
important role that these moral powers play in deriving his two
principles of justice." 3
But democratic citizens, even in an idealized form, are more than
just a bundle of moral powers. Instead, they are both democrats and
citizens. As democrats, they do not just insist on their own rights and
follow rules of justice that provide for the realization of their primary
goods. Nor do they press for the realization of others' primary goods
simply because, if they did not, they might lose out themselves given
the structure of the Veil of Ignorance that they place themselves
behind as part of what I take to be a very honorable moral endeavor.
Instead, they acknowledge that they belong to a community that
(ideally) accepts all adult members of the community as equals in the
sharing of power.
As citizens, they do not just manifest or idealize the community of
which they are a part. Instead, they act out the idealized nature of this
community; they work to realize its goals, values and principles. In
the case of democratic citizens, among these goals is the inclusion of
all adult members of the community as co-governors. Hence, in acting
out the idealized nature of their community, democratic citizens qua
democratic citizens work, among other things, to include all adult
members of the community in the governance of that community and
111. See id. at 24-27.
112. Id. at 13-14.
113. Id. at 81-86.
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to pursue other democratic ends in the process. What might this
entail and how might it help us in this context?
As things now stand, democratic theorists differ greatly about the
required purview of inclusion in both the public and private sphere, as
well as about what is required of such inclusion." 4 Hence, we cannot
hope to put forward the theory of democratic identity. Nor can we
insist that all interpretations of democratic citizenship take racism and
sexism seriously to the extent of requiring their elimination. But we
can put forward a definition of democratic identity that allows us to
assume that those who think and act on the basis of this identity
challenge patriarchy and other hierarchical structures of domination.
Two things are required here if this identity is going to be helpful to
us. The first is a sense that democracy can-and has to-exist in both
the public and private spheres, rather than in just the public sphere
alone. For, otherwise, we will, as Carole Pateman, Susan Okin and
many others have pointed out over the years, never be able to get rid
of patriarchy as a general system of power." 5 Nor will we, given both
the pervasiveness of patriarchy and the relationship between our
private and public lives, be able to realize democracy in the public
sphere. In other words, we will defeat ourselves as democrats if we
limit our call for democracy.
Second, democracy itself cannot be understood here simply in terms
of equal rights or fair distributions of goods-even if the goods to be
distributed are respect and dignity. Nor can it be construed in purely
individualistic terms. Instead, it has to be construed at least partly in
terms of the power relationships that exist between community
members. Otherwise, it could not guarantee the full inclusion of
women and minorities in either the private or the public spheres as cogovernors.
Neither of these conditions is impossible, or even difficult, to meet.
Indeed, as democratic theorists, we can, as Ian Shapiro and others
now do, include the absence of non-hierarchical relationships of
domination in our definition of democracy itself."6 Likewise, we can,
without moving too far outside of the mainstream of contemporary, if
not traditional, democratic thought, go on to insist that both
patriarchy and systems of racial subordination violate democracy
understood as such.
In other words, we can in a relatively
uncontroversial way-although not in a way that all democratic
theorists would accept-stipulate that democratic citizenship requires
114. Three of the most widely read opponents of placing social inclusion at the
center of democracy are Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (1995); Brian Barry,
Culture and Equality (2001); and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of
America (1991).
115. For one of the most comprehensive statements of this argument, see Pateman,
supra note 9.
116. See Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (1999).
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actively challenging the two systems of power that now result in the
subordination
of women and minorities in our society and
17
elsewhere.
Moreover, we might-in a much more controversial way-write
such a notion of democratic citizenship back into Rawls's Original
Position in the guise of his "political persons" and in doing so allow
ourselves to stipulate that the principles of justice that such "political
persons," whom Rawls himself characterizes as democratic citizens," 8
choose in the Original Position take into consideration the need to
challenge patriarchy and other systems of hierarchical domination. In
other words, we might in this context hope for the generation of
principles of justice within at least the formal structure of Rawls's
Original Position that capture the kinds of normative positions that
Susan Okin, Kevin Graham and all others who are concerned with
combating sexism and racism insist upon.
Could Rawls possibly accept such an amendment? Rawls could
accept this amendment with respect to what he says in Political
Liberalism about individuals in the Original Position as both citizens
and democrats. Moreover, he must accept this amendment if he wants
to continue using his references to the culture of liberal democracy as
the (partial) source of his principles of justice. But, in accepting this
amendment, he would clearly challenge, if not violate, some of his
more purely liberal tenets-those having to do with both toleration
and limits to state action, as well as the role of rational choice in his
general theory of justice.
While he might, like other liberal democrats, be able to fashion
some sort of compromise between democracy, as understood above,
and these liberal tenets, and do so on the basis of a Rawlsian
calculation about how much we could get of these two things together,
he could not get around the dual-motivation problem. Indeed, he
would of necessity have to choose between the two motivations in
question, namely, those associated with rational actors and democratic
citizens respectively. Moreover, the necessity of making such a choice
is not, as we might think, new to Rawls. Instead, it captures the very
deep tension that has always existed in his theory between the needs
of his rational choice model, on the one hand, and his call for
inclusion, on the other.

117. I argue this position more fully in Re-thinking "Paternalism"for a Democratic
Welfare State, Soc. Theory & Prac. (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
118. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 29-35.
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